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Book Notices 
THE LAWSUIT LOTTERY: ONLY THE LAWYERS WIN.* By Jeffrey 
O'Connell. New York: The Free Press. 1979. Pp. ix, 271. $10.95. 
I am grateful to Professor Jeffrey O'Connell. Three times in the 
past few years my insurance company has paid me promptly and 
fully for damages suffered in automobile crashes. In each case, my 
no-fault insurance policy spared me the dubious pleasure of litiga-
tion. And that policy exists today because Professor O'Connell's pio-
neering efforts in 19651 have borne fruit in the nation's automobile 
insurance laws. · 
Professor O'Connell has continued his campaign to reform the 
"accident industry." Five years ago, he suggested allowing manufac-
turers and professionals to elect no-fault liability rather than com-
mon-law tort liability for their products and services.2 Any 
enterprise could escape fault-based liability by promising to give no-
fault reimbursement for all economic losses that might arise from 
enterprise-related injuries. The enterprise would not be liable for 
any non-economic losses such as pain and suffering. Perhaps unsur-
prisingly, that plan received criticism from both sides of the accident 
compensation debate. Defenders of the fault system labeled the pro-
posal a "first step towards placing all members of society at the 
mercy of an industrial and commercial monolith."3 And radical re-
formers complained that O'Connell's plan did not take the ultimate 
step of replacing the tort system with a comprehensive income-main-
tenance system.4 In his latest book, The Lawsuit Lottery: Only the 
Lawyers Win, O'Connell responds to his critics by proffering a new 
and ingenious way to compensate accident victims without regard to 
fault.5 
• This book review was prepared by an Editor of the Michigan Law Review.-Ed. 
1. See R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM: A 
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965). 
2. J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: No FAULT INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS 
AND SERVICES (1975). 
· 3. Corboy, The Expanding Universe of Jeffrey O'Connell· Backing into a Brave New World, 
1976 U. ILL L.F. 74, 74 (1976). See also Schwartz, Professor O'Connell's No-Faull Plan for 
Products and Services: Have New Problems Been Subsliluled for Old?, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 639 
(1975); Blum, Book Review, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 217 (1975); Cooperrider, Book Review, 22 
WAYNE L. REV. 189 (1975). 
4. See Palmer, Inspired Tinkering Versus Holistic Social Engineering: Jeffrey O'Connell and 
the American Tori System, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 893 (1976). 
5. The book is a distillation of ideas that Professor O'Connell developed in numerous arti-
cles over the past five years. See, e.g., O'Connell, Supplementing Workers' Compensation Bene-
fits in Return for an Assignment of Third-Par/)' Tori Claims - Without an Enabling Slalule, 56 
TEXAS L. REV. 537 (1978); O'Connell, Harnessing the Liabilil)' Lo11e,y: Elective First-Par/)' No-
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In the first half of his book, O'Connell challenges both the proc-
ess of fault determination and the values underlying it. He con-
demns litigation as capricious, cruel, and inefficient. The 
receptiveness of juries to emotional appeals, the propensity of those 
in the accident business to falsify, and the ineptitude of many law-
yers and judges all lead to capricious decisions. The delay inherent 
in litigation only aggravates the .financial and emotional problems 
that attend the accident. O'Connell identifies the victim's two great-
est needs as prompt compensation and rehabilitation. Litigation de-
lays foster anxiety over mounting debts and force the claimant to 
relive the accident over and over, dwelling on the pain and suffering 
it caused. The process encourages debilitation rather than rehabili-
tation. Finally, litigation is wasteful. Only a fraction6 of the tort 
liability insurance dollar is received by the few victims who obtain a 
judgment. The costs of determining fault and appraising pain and 
suffering eat up most of the insurance dollar. 
Professor O'Connell advocates a policy fundamentally different 
from that underlying fault-based liability. The concept of fault is 
morally judgmental; tort systems seek to do justice between wrong-
doer and wronged. O'Connell, on the other hand, believes that acci-
dents are morally neutral and that all accident victims should be 
compensated. For him, the most damning criticism of the tort system 
is that only a few accident victims - those with valuable, fault-
based claims - recover their losses.7 However, fault-based liability 
serves two other goals besides a just distribution oflosses: deterrence 
and allocative effi.ciency.8 Critics have called O'Connell "insensi-
Fault Insurance Financed by Third-Party Tort Claims, 1978 WASH. U. L. Q. 693 (1978); 
O'Connell, Traneferring Injured Victims' Tort Rights to No-Fault Insurers, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 
749; O'Connell, Operation of No-Fault Auto Laws: A Survey of the Surveys, 56 NEB. L. REv. 23 
(1977); O'Connell, The Interlocking .Death and Rebirth of Contract and Tort, 75 MICH. L. REV. 
659 (1977); O'Connell, Contractingfar No-Fault Liability Insurance Covering .Doctors and Hos-
pitals, 36 Mo. L. REV. 553 (1977); O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tori Liability: 
Elective No-Fault Insurance far Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REV. 501 (1976). 
6. For example, only 28 cents of the malpractice insurance dollar ends up in the hands of 
the victims. P. 179. 
7. Professor Luke Cooperrider has noted that the tort system was not designed to give 
compensation for accident victims. "Tort law is a system of conflict resolution, by nature 
contentious. It is difficult to see how it could be otherwise, or how it could come to be thought 
of as a likely machine for the efficient treatment of massive social problems." Cooperrider, 
supra note 3, at 194. pefenders of the tort system say the system is successful precisely because 
few accident victims receive compensation. It is intended to be a system of limited liability, to 
apportion losses on the basis of fault. See Henderson, "Crisis" in Accident Lass Reparations 
Systems: Where We Are and How We Got There, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 401. Those scholars 
suggest that delays, lack of access for small claimants, and other such problems should be fixed 
by improving the system, not by placing compensation on an insurance rather than liability 
basis. See Green, No-Fault: A Perspective, 1975 B.Y. L. REV. 79 (1975); Schwartz, supra note 
3; Corboy, supra note 3. 
8. See Posner, A Comment on No-Fault Insurance far All Accidents, 13 OsooooE HALL L.J. 
471 (1975). 
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tive" to these policies.9 The second half of the book attempts to meet 
those criticisms by proposing a system of no-fault compensation for 
accident victims that preserves fault-based liability for producers. 
Professor O'Connell proposes that insurance companies sell no-
fault policies that give limited reimbursem~nt for all economic losses 
that the insured suffers in accidents. For example, a policy could be 
limited to injuries inflicted by particular products or services on their 
purchasers. The policies would not reimburse for non-economic 
losses, such as pain and suffering, or for losses compensated by col-
lateral sources. In return, the insured would transfer to the insur-
ance company any tort claims against third parties. The insurer 
could prosecute these claims and collect both economic and non-eco-
nomic damages. Moreover, the insurer would agree to use any re-
covery of economic losses to compensate the insured for economic 
losses that exceed the no-fault coverage. If the insured feels that the 
insurance c9mpany has not vigorously pressed the economic claim 
( or has settled for low economic damages, which go to the insured, in 
return for high non-economic damages, which the company keeps), 
the insured can demand arbitration with the company over the value 
of the claim. "By this device the insured will be guaranteed 
whatever level of no-fault benefits he wished to purchase, plus 
whatever amounts of economic loss in excess of that limit he is eligi-
ble for under a fault-finding claim" (p. 188). 
One may wonder where the insurer obtains the money to com-
pensate victims lacking fault-based claims. O'Connell's scheme gen-
erates this surplus by cutting transaction costs, by eliminating double 
recoveries, and by eliminating noneconomic recoveries. It would 
also decrease the cost of determining fault because large insurance 
companies are "more likely to settle the matter expeditiously by in-
formal means and without expensive litigation. . ." (p. 188). 
One may also wonder whether consumers will yield their rights 
to pain and suffering damages in exchange for no-fault coverage. 
O'Connell notes that at present, plaintiffs must sell one third of their 
claims to recover anything. 10 He argues that most consumers would 
prefer a plan that offers prompt, certain reimbursement for at least 
some and perhaps all economic losses over a system that gives 
delayed recovery of larger awards (a third of which goes to their 
lawyer) for those few "lucky" victims who happen to have a valid 
tort claim against a wealthy third party. . 
Professor O'Connell's plan manifests several desirable features in 
addition to its capacity to compensate all accident victims. First, it is 
voluntary. No consumer would be coerced into yielding any com-
9. Id. 
IO. The contingent fee is essentially a sale by the claimant of a portion of his claim to the 
lawyer in return for representation. 
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mon-law rights. Voluntariness increases the likelihood that courts 
will uphold these proposed no-fault policies. Second, producers 
would continue to incur fault liability. Thus, O'Connell's scheme 
seems to serve the goals of deterrence and allocative efficiency as 
well as the present system. Finally, it is practical. O'Connell claims 
that no implementing legislation is necessary. He is confident that it 
is in the economic interests of insurers and consumers to agree to 
such policies. Although he might prefer a sweeping no-fault system 
such as New Zealand's,11 Professor O'Connell concludes that such a 
revolutionary change is not likely in America and that even with its 
imperfections, his first-party, elective no-fault system is "infinitely 
superior to the lawyers' fault-finding system" (p. 213). 
If successful, Professor O'Connell's proposal would probably 
solve many problems that plague fault-based compensation systems. 
However, several steps in Professor O'Connell's analysis invite criti-
cism. Perhaps most susceptible to attack is Professor O'Connell's as-
sumption that consumers will purchase the no-fault policies. 
Historically, consumers have ·shown little inclination to buy first-
party personal injury coverage. Their disinclination is probably re-
lated to the price of such policies. Professor O'Connell argues that a 
dollar would buy more coverage under his plan than under a con-
ventional plan because the consumer would also surrender the right 
to sue. Yet the value will have to be significantly higher to entice 
people to buy coverage that they have shunned in the past. Sec-
ondly, Professor O'Connell may be too bold when he asserts that the 
costs of determining fault and valuing pain and suffering will be sig-
nificantly lower when two insuran.ce companies are the opponents at 
trial. Moreover, by giving the insured a right to demand arbitration 
with the insurance company, his plan adds an entirely new proceed-
ing, the cost of which may swallow up any savings from reduced 
litigation. Finally, the :financial soundness of the plan depends to a 
large degree on the fund accumulated out of pain and suffering 
awards. Professor O'Connell asserts that insurance companies press-
ing the claims of their customers would continue to reap huge 
awards for pain and suffering. But even with procedural safeguards 
to shield the jury from knowledge of the true party in interest, the 
awards could be expected to drop. Greater acceptance of 
O'Connell's proposal would bring greater citizen awareness that the 
injured victim is only a nominal plaintiff for the unsympathetic in-
surer. Consequently, no-fault insurance rates would rise to make up 
the diff erence.12 The system would drift closer to a comprehensive 
11. For a description of the comprehensive no-fault system in New Zealand, see Palmer, 
Accident Compensation in New Zealand: The First Two Years, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. I (1977). 
12. This rise might be tempered if enlightened jurors realized that large noneconomic 
damage awards would tend to lower their insurance rates under O'Connell's plan. 
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social insurance plan and would undermine the policies of deter-
rence and allocative efficiency - a prospect that might not disturb 
Professor O'Connell, whose primary concern is for the "lonely, 
frightened, wounded accident victims" who now go uncompensated 
(p. 188). 
Whatever the merits of O'Connell's proposal, The Lawsuit Lot-
tery will certainly draw widespread attention. The book is a plea-
sure to read. The author's rhetoric13 may offend some, but his 
writing is clear and concise. He also has a sense of drama. He 
weaves stories and gossip about the personalities involved in the ac-
cident business - t~e victims, lawyers, judges, and tow truck opera-
tors - into a coherent pattern. At times he may deduce too much 
from isolated incidents, but on the whole he is fair, arguing his views 
persuasively and attempting to meet opposing arguments squarely. 
Executives in the corporations whose business is to spread the costs 
of accidents should consider this book with care. If O'Connell is 
right, we all have a lot to gain. 
13. The following passage typifies the author's style: 
"[P]erhaps the most distressing aspect of the co=on law's system of personal injury 
insurance is that it compounds its problems by requiring everyone, in effect, to buy fault-
finding insurance, which, from the individual's point of view, is largely worthless and 
horrendously expensive, even though some people hit the jackpot." 
P. 196. 
